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It would mean that because my deceitfulness has promoted 
God's glory by giving scope to his truthfulness, I on my 
side do not deserve to be condemned as a sinner. If so, why 
should we not do evil so that good may come of it? That is 
what we are accused of preaching by some of our 
detractors; and their condemnation of it is just.
i
  
John Paul II concludes the second chapter of Veritatis Splendor, saying: 
By acknowledging and teaching the existence of intrinsic evil in 
given human acts, the Church remains faithful to the integral truth 
about man; she thus respects and promotes man in his dignity and 
vocation. Consequently, she must reject the theories set forth 
above, which contradict this truth.
ii
 
The "theories set forth above" to which the Holy Father refers are known as "consequentialism" 
and "proportionalism." Classical consequentialism, also called "utilitarianism," begins with 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and the two Mills (James 1773-1836, and his son John Stuart, 
1806-1873), and culminates in the work of Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) the last classical 
consequentialist. The principal thesis of consequentialism is that the morality of an action is 
nothing but a function of its consequences. Accordingly, consequentialists propose that the 
action which one ought to do is the one which realizes the greatest net good consequences or the 
least net bad consequences. In accordance with consequentialism, one reasons, for example, that 
it is best to procure the judicial execution of an innocent man for the good of the many. 
Consequentialists do not hold that there are actions which one may never perform, no matter 
what the consequences of not performing them, because they assert that the goodness or badness 
of each action depends solely upon the consequences of the action. Consequentialism is the 
dominant ethical theory of our time; nonetheless, it is not the topic of this paper. 
 Proportionalism, the concern of this paper, has a short history, found exclusively within 
Catholic moral theology. Proportionalism begins with the rejection of Humanae Vitae,
iii
 and 
with certain Catholic moral theologians' novel interpretations of both Romans 3:8 and double 
effect reasoning - often referred to as the "principle of double effect."
iv
 Based on the 
distinction, one does not assert that what an agent foresees, but 
does not intend has no role in assessing the ethical status of an 
action. By the intended/foreseen distinction one notes only that the 
agent's intention has greater import in determining the ethical 
status of the act than what the agent foresees as an effect, but does 
not intend. Accordingly, the intended/foreseen distinction is 
proposed as necessary, but not sufficient for a complete analysis 
of an action which effects both good and evil. Double effect reasoning 
also depends upon a comparison of the responsibilities which the 
agent has to realize or to protect the goods at issue in the action 
which effects both good and evil. According to double effect 
reasoning, the agent who foresees that his action will cause both 
good and evil must have a greater or equal responsibility to effect 
the intended good end than to avoid effecting the foreseen evil. Thus, 
speaking generally, in accordance with double effect reasoning, one 
proposes that if 1) an agent foresees that by his action he will effect 
both an intended good end and a foreseen, but not intended evil and 
2) he has a greater or equal responsibility to realize the good end 
than he has to avoid causing the evil, then, if he acts, his action 
will be ethically in the clear. 
 Proportionalism originates with an article on the principle of double effect by the 
theologian Peter Knauer. This article first appeared in French in 1965. It was revised and 
published in German in 1967, and then translated into English. The English version, entitled The 
Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect, was published in the Natural Law 
Forum.
v
 Knauer attempts in this article to ground proportionalism on Thomas Aquinas's 
treatment of double effect reasoning. In what follows, I will present Knauer's interpretation of 
Aquinas's account of double effect reasoning and give the most compelling reasons for rejecting 
this interpretation. 
 
I 
Aquinas's Account of Private Homicidal Self-Defense 
 The locus classicus of double effect reasoning is Thomas Aquinas's discussion of the 
private individual's act of homicidal self-defense (S.T. IIaIIae q.64, a.7). Question 64 occurs 
within his consideration of the vices opposed to commutative justice. Specifically, question 64 
concerns death, which Aquinas considers the greatest injury one can inflict on one's neighbor 
against the will of one's neighbor. In a.7, Thomas asks whether it is licit to kill a man in 
self-defense. In his discussion of war (IIaIIae, q. 40, a.1), he has previously noted that Augustine 
judges it licit for one charged with the common good to take life during a war for the sake of the 
common good. Thomas himself asserts that it is licit for public officials, as public officials, to 
 4 
take life intentionally for the sake of the common good. According to Aquinas, this prerogative 
extends to a public official, as a public official, taking life intentionally in self-defense. Thus, the 
issue in article 7 of question 64 concerns a private individual's act of homicidal self-defense. It 
is here, in his consideration of this issue, that Thomas originates double effect, and here, as I will 
argue, that Knauer misinterprets him. 
 Thomas, in article 7, takes one objection against homicidal self-defense from St. 
Augustine's de Libro Arbitrio. Augustine asks: 
How are they free from sin in the sight of divine providence who, 
for the sake of these contemnible things, have taken a human life? 
(q. 64, a. 7, ob.2) 
If, as Aquinas notes, corporeal life can be included among the contemnible goods which men 
may forfeit against their wills, Augustine appears to rule out homicidal self-defense. In his 
response to this objection, Thomas interprets Augustine as not permitting the intentional taking 
of an aggressor's life. 
 Thomas claims that in order that the private individual's act of homicidal self-defense be 
licit, the death of the aggressor must be praeter intentionem, that is, outside the individual's 
intention. He uses praeter intentionem to refer to a foreseen consequence of an action which 
comes about neither intentionally, nor inevitably, nor accidentally, but as a characteristic, 
non-exclusive result -- that is, as one result amongst a number of normal possibilities. Thus, 
Thomas distinguishes between the intended means and ends of an act and the foreseen effects of 
that same act which are not intended. Although Aquinas does not understand the circumstances 
surrounding the defense of one's life to be voluntary without qualification, he does understand 
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the agent to act voluntarily within those circumstances imposed by the aggressor (IaIIae, q.6, 
a.3). Thus, if the assailant dies, the defender causes his death voluntarily, though he does not 
intend it. Accordingly, the defender must have a justification for killing the aggressor. 
 What does Aquinas understand such a justification to be? In q. 64, a.7, he argues that: 
It is not necessary for salvation for a man to forego 
(praetermittat) an act of moderate defense in order to avoid 
(evitandum) the death of another, since a man is more responsible 
to provide (plus tenetur .. providere) for his own life than for that 
of another.  
When he says that one is "plus tenetur ... providere," he notes that one has more of an 
obligation to watch over one's own life than to do so over another's. Thus, when it comes to 
preserving lives, one is, ceteris paribus, more obliged to preserve one's own than another's. Of 
course, the "all other things being equal" clause covers factors like the role one has with respect 
to preserving the other person's life. For example, a captain of a sinking ship may be more 
obliged to save a passenger's life than his own. Since, on Thomas's account, one is ordinarily 
more bound to care for one's own life than for that of another, one has no obligation to forego 
risking an attacker's life. One who would not defend his own life when it entails endangering the 
life of an attacker might exercise too little responsibility with respect to the great good of the life 
entrusted to him. Thus, Aquinas understands homicidal self-defense to be legitimate when the 
death of the attacker is not intended and it results from the individual's intentional preservation of 
his own life. 
 Aquinas does not say that the moral analysis of an act of homicidal self-defense requires 
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an evaluative comparison of the lives in question. Nor does he say anything indicating that the 
life of one who attacks has been forfeited. He does present one criterion as a prerequisite for an 
ethically acceptable use of force: the force used must be proportionatus fini. By demanding that 
the force used in self-defense be proportioned to the end of self-preservation, he reiterates and 
explicitly acknowledges a criterion voiced by Gregory: in order for the use of force to be ethical, 
the force used to repel force must be moderate - cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae. A 
defense is not blameless if it is not moderate. For example, a defense would not be blameless if 
one could use mace, but, instead, used a machete. 
 This criterion -- that the means must be proportioned to the end of self-preservation -- 
appears straightforward. Thomas is not easily interpreted to mean by proportionatus fini that 
the one who defends his own life must weigh the value of his own life against the attacker's. He 
claims only that one is justified in using moderate force which may be lethal because one has a 
greater obligation to preserve his own life than another's. 
 Nonetheless, by proportionatus fini some have interpreted Aquinas to mean a 
comparative weighing of goods. This interpretation is demonstrably mistaken, and, more 
importantly, in taking on a life of its own as proportionalism, has come to occupy a prominent 
place in contemporary Catholic moral theology, as the Holy Father's rejection of it in Veritatis 
Splendor indicates. 
 
II 
Knauer's Interpretation 
 Peter Knauer, in what can without exaggeration be called the seminal article of 
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proportionalism,
vi
 cites q. 64, a. 7 as an instance of proportionalistic thinking. He pays particular 
attention to the following passage in that article: 
But some act arising from a good intention can be made unlawful 
if it is not proportionate to the end [proportionatus fini]. And so, 
if someone in defending his own life uses greater violence than is 
necessary, it will be unlawful. But if he moderately repels 
violence, it will be a lawful defense.
vii
  
One would think that by the phrases "proportionate to the end" and "moderately repels violence" 
Aquinas would mean, as Knauer himself suggests (not as an interpretation, but as his 
independent observation), that "one may not kill an aggressor, however unjust, if in other ways 
one can save oneself and other possible victims."
viii
 Similarly, this concept of an act's being 
proportioned to its end operates in Knauer's judgement that "a physician may prescribe a drug 
which has bad side effects only until medical science finds a drug just as effective but without 
the side effects."
ix
 This criterion -- that an act must be proportioned to its end -- is not exotic. It 
is commonly understood that what should be done to attain an end is that which is requisite to 
effect the end -- that, and no more. In the case considered by Thomas, the act by which the 
defender preserves his life while causing the least harm to the aggressor would be proportioned 
to the end of self-preservation. 
 Knauer, however, thinks that Thomas proposes something different from, though similar 
to, this principle of moderation. He understands Aquinas to mean: 
In sinning, man seeks a real good, but his act in its total existential 
entirety is not proportioned to this good. Then the evil arising 
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thereby, whether it is desired or not, belongs objectively to the act 
and is objectively what is "intended."
x
 
There are two significant problems with Knauer's interpretation. First, he contradicts the 
statement with which Aquinas introduces his discussion of proportionatus fini. Thomas says 
that the act, even if it arises from a good intention (therefore, an act in which harm is not 
intended) may not be blameless if it is not proportioned to its end -- in this case, 
self-preservation. Therefore, Aquinas holds that an act could originate from a good intention and 
not be proportioned to its end. Knauer denies this. Second, he maintains that Thomas, in his 
discussion of proportionatus fini, asserts that a harmful effect is intended if and only if the 
action productive of it causes less good than evil. Aquinas, however, distinguishes what the 
agent intends as an end from whether or not the act is proportioned to the intended end. 
Accordingly, he argues that the defender must not intend the death of the assailant and that the 
defender must not use greater force than is necessary to preserve his own life. According to 
Thomas, if the defender does not intend to take the life of the aggressor, but acts with excessive 
force, he would not act well, insofar as his use of force exceeds what is necessary for 
self-defense. Thus, Thomas holds that the homicidal act of self-defense must not be either an 
intentional taking of life, or a use of excessive force. Knauer, however, holds that the act is an 
intentional taking of life if the agent uses excessive force. 
 Knauer attempts further to explicate Aquinas's account, saying: 
Thomas also held that the evil might not be effected directly. 
According to him, the intention must be accidental (per accidens); 
it must be beyond intention (praeter intentionem).
xi
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Yet, nowhere in q. 64, a.7 does Aquinas speak of effecting the harm directly or indirectly, as 
Knauer claims. Moreover, Knauer asserts that Aquinas uses praeter intentionem to refer to an 
"accidental" intention. Thomas, however, clearly denies that what is outside the intention is 
intended in any sense. Knauer describes what is not intended as intended in some special 
fashion. By praeter intentionem Aquinas refers to an effect which is not intended. Thomas 
does not use the phrase, as Knauer maintains, to describe a way of intending. It is not clear what 
Knauer means when he says that what is outside the intention is an accidental intention. It is 
clear, however, that Knauer offers a confused and confusing interpretation of Aquinas. 
 Further manifesting his misunderstanding of Aquinas's account, Knauer states: 
There are further pairs of concepts which also stand in the same 
relation to the requirement of a commensurate reason. There are, 
for example, per se - per accidens and "in intention" - "beyond 
intention" in the text cited from St. Thomas [q.64, a.7]. The use of 
these different concepts for one and the same reality reveals that 
the scholastics had not reflected thoroughly enough on their 
meanings.
xii
  
Knauer equates the distinctions per se/per accidens and intentionem/praeter intentionem with 
proportionatus fini and describes it as "having a commensurate reason." In fact, Thomas holds 
that what is intended is essential in determining the goodness or badness of an act, while what is 
praeter intentionem does not have the same essential significance. He expresses this by saying 
that what is intended is per se and what is praeter intentionem is per accidens to the ethical 
analysis of an act. Because intention is essential to that analysis, Thomas argues that for a private 
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individual's act of homicidal self-defense to be justified, the death of the aggressor must not be 
intended. Moreover, because the defender might gratuitously endanger the life of the assailant 
while not intending to take the aggressor's life, Thomas, as we have seen, reiterates the criterion 
proposed by Gregory that the force used in defense of life must be proportionatus fini, that is, 
proportioned to the end of self-preservation. 
 Understanding his version of double effect to be the whole of morality, Knauer reduces 
the moral analysis of human action to his flawed interpretation of what it means for an act to be 
proportionatus fini. With such whimsy, he founds proportionalism: 
I say that an evil effect is not "directly intended" only if there is a 
"commensurate ground" for its permission or causation. There are 
not two distinct requirements when I speak of the "indirect 
causing" of evil and of "a commensurate reason" for the act. 
[Double effect reasoning] may be adequately formulated as 
follows: One may permit the evil effect of his act only if he has a 
commensurate reason for it.
xiii
 
While Aquinas distinguishes the intention of evil from any quantitative relation between the evil 
and good caused, Knauer maintains that an agent intends an evil effect if, and only if, the agent 
does not cause greater good than evil. Thus, if the agent were to cause greater good than evil by 
the act, the agent, according to Knauer, would not intend the evil. There could be no more 
serious and potentially pernicious misconstrual of double effect. 
 By proportionatus fini Aquinas does not mean what Knauer asserts: that "an objective is 
sought which has an appropriate price (tantum - quantum)."
xiv
 What would such a requirement 
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amount to, if not a quid pro quo, a tit for tat, his life for mine? Aquinas proposes 
proportionatus fini to denote a precondition for the use of such force as endangers the life of an 
attacker: the act of self-defense must be moderate. Thus, the use of a potentially lethal weapon is 
not to be countenanced when all that needs to be done is to turn on a light, or let the dog out of 
the house, or call 911, or throw a net or blanket over an attacker, even though the act of 
self-defense endangering the attacker's life would proceed from the good intention of 
self-preservation. The defender using force proportioned to the end of self-preservation does not 
hold the aggressor's life to be of lesser value than his own. Knauer's attempt to ground 
proportionalism on Aquinas's account of homicidal self-defense does not withstand a careful 
scrutiny. 
 Knauer's account has another significant defect. As we have seen, he maintains that an 
agent intends a bad effect if and only if the agent does not cause more good than evil. If the agent 
effects greater good than evil, the agent does not intend the evil; for, Knauer holds, in such a case 
the agent has a commensurate reason for effecting the evil -- the good which he will bring about. 
Such a position cannot be attributed to Aquinas; nor is such an account of the intention of evil 
tenable in its own right. The objects of intentions are ends and the means ordered towards those 
ends. Since means are discovered by deliberation, one intends them when one discovers them in 
deliberation and chooses them as ordered towards a given end. Accordingly, the question which 
arises when one asks whether or not something is intended by an agent is not "how much good 
did the agent realize by causing this thing?", but, rather, questions such as "did the agent's 
willing of the thing lead him to deliberate about how to achieve it?" and "was this thing done by 
the agent insofar as it was ordered towards the realization of some end the intention of which 
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caused him to enter into deliberation?" Knauer, however, focuses exclusively on the quantitative 
relationship between the evil and the good effected by an agent. Thus, Knauer fails to account for 
the salient role of deliberation in determining what an agent intends and does not intend. 
 Moreover, he cannot account for our application of the concept of intention to ordinary 
cases in which one does not cause evil. By means of double effect reasoning, we analyze 
exceptional cases in which we cannot realize a good end without also causing a bad effect. 
Nonetheless, the concept of intention by which we illuminate such situations is not limited to 
those situations. We examine such cases by employing the concept of intention which we acquire 
from ordinary cases, independently of our analysis of extraordinary cases in which the causing of 
good and evil are conjoined. Knauer, however, relies on an account of intention which is 
necessarily limited to cases in which both good and evil are effected. Thus, he lacks the 
resources to explain what it usually means for an agent to intend some object. 
 More importantly, Knauer's understanding of the intention of evil nullifies St. Paul's 
statement in Romans. For, according to Knauer, evil would not be intended by one who causes 
greater good by doing evil. St. Paul, however, teaches that no matter how great a good may be 
effected by the doing of evil, we are not to do evil for the sake of that good. St. Paul implicitly 
separates the doing of evil from the quantitative relation between the evil done and the good 
effected by doing it. In opposition to St. Paul, Knauer maintains that if an agent causes greater 
good than evil, he does not do the evil because he does not intend it. In such a case, according to 
Knauer, the evil simply happens and cannot be attributed to the agent; for the agent causes 
greater good, and therefore, by definition, does not intend the evil. 
 Although proportionalism began with Knauer, it did not end with him. Richard 
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McCormick, who has been described as "the champion of proportionalism in the United 
States,"
xv
 denies Knauer's account of the intention of evil. McCormick thinks that Knauer 
renders the concept of intention vacuous insofar as Knauer makes the intention of evil depend on 
one's not causing greater good than evil. McCormick amends Knauer's basic position by 
asserting that, for a great enough good, evil may be done intentionally.
xvi
 McCormick thus 
makes proportionalism less ambiguous and more clearly opposed to St. Paul's admonition and 
the consistent tradition of Catholic moral theology which teaches that there are some actions 
which are evil and are, therefore, not to be done -- no matter how great a good may be brought 
about by doing them. 
 In the three decades since Knauer's seminal account, proportionalism has shown itself to 
be a hydra.
xvii
 Whatever disagreements exist within the proportionalist camp, there is one 
common feature of all such accounts: the denial of Romans 3:8. In Veritatis Splendor, John 
Paul II reiterates the Pauline doctrine that evil is not to be done for the sake of good -- no matter 
what the consequences. Since proportionalism departs from St. Paul's admonition and the 
theological tradition which follows from reflection on that admonition, the Holy Father notes the 
ultimate untenability of the account as a guide for human action. 
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